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OF BUFFER ZONES AND BROKEN BONES:
BALANCING ACCESS TO ABORTION AND ANTIABORTION PROTESTORS' FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS IN SCHENCK V. PRO-CHOICENETWORK1
DeborahA Ellist & Yolanda S. Wu
INTRODUCTION

Courts have been striving for some time to protect the
safety of patients and providers at reproductive health care
facilities' without infringing anti-abortion protestors' free
speech rights.2 Protecting the safety of patients at reproduc"1996 Deborah A. Ellis & Yolanda S. Wu. All Rights Reserved.
ls. Ellis, a cum laude graduate of New York University School of Law and
Yale College, was the Legal Director of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
from 1992 to 1996. She argued Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 505
U.S. 263 (1993), before the United States Supreme Court and is co-counsel in
Schenck for Respondents. She is an adjunct assistant professor at New York
University School of Law.
t Ms. Wu is a staff attorney at NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, and
is co-counsel in Schenck for Respondents. She graduated from UCLA School of
Law and Princeton University, and is author of Genocidal Rape in Bosnia: Redress
in United States Courts Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S W.
101 (1993).
1 We use the term "reproductive health care facilities" interchangeably with
"abortion clinics" because most clinics that provide abortions also provide other
health care such as pap smears, prenatal care and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases. See Stanley K. Henshaw, The Accessibility of Abortion Seruices in
the United States, 23 FAIL PLAI. PERSP. 246, 247 tbL 1 (1991) (in a 1989 study of
nonhospital abortion facilities, 94% provided contraceptive care, 91% provided general gynecological care, 881% provided treatment for sexually transmitted diseases,
64% provided infertility services, 601% provided HIV testing, 51% provided obstetric
care, 45% provided general medical care and 24% provided non-gynecological surgery to nonabortion patients).
2 The Supreme Court twice before has addressed the conflict between the First
Amendment and abortion rights. Most recently, in Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.,
Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, rehg denied, 115 S. Ct. 23 (1994), the Court announced a
new test for analyzing the constitutionality of injunctions that restrict free speech.
See infra text accompanying notes 48-62. In Frisby v. Schultz, 487 US. 474
(1988), the Court upheld a city ordinance that banned targeted picketing in residential areas. The city had passed the ordinance in response to picketing outside
the residence of a doctor who performed abortions.
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tive health care facilities is crucial because without access, the
constitutional right to abortion will become a nullity. Although
abortion has been a constitutional right for twenty-three
years,3 it has become increasingly difficult for women to obtain
one. A significant barrier is pervasive anti-choice violence consisting of harassment, blockades, vandalism, arson, death
threats and even murder.4 This severe violence can prevent
women from obtaining an abortion or make it much more difficult to do so. It is partly responsible for the fact that eightythree percent of counties in the United States do not have an
abortion provider.'
While patients and providers must be given legal protection in order that women can exercise freely their constitutional right to abortion, it is important to do so without trampling
on the legitimate First Amendment rights of anti-abortion
protestors. Measures to protect access to reproductive health
facilities fall into two categories: court injunctions and legislative statutes or ordinances. Anti-abortion protestors ' have
In addition, numerous lower courts have addressed the conflict between free
expression and protecting access to abortion. For a discussion of cases applying the
Madsen standard to injunctions, see infra text accompanying notes 75-80. For a
discussion of cases incorrectly applying the Madsen standard to ordinances, see
infra text accompanying notes 81-85.
' See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 183 (1973). In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992), the Court reaffirmed the constitutional protection for abortion, but
rejected Roe's trimester framework and instituted a new "undue burden" test for
evaluating abortion restrictions.
' This violence has continued even since the May 1994 enactment of The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE"). Statistics gathered by the National Abortion Federation reflect that for the year 1995 and through the first seven
months of 1996, abortion providers reported 43 bomb threats, 67 stalking incidents, 43 death threats, 41 vandalism incidents, 15 arsons, 2 bombings and 1 attempted murder. NAT'L ABORTION FEDERATION, INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AND DISRUPTION AGAINST ABORTION PROVIDERS 1, 1 (1996).

a S. REP. No. 117, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 n.29 (1993); Stanley K. Henshaw
& Jennifer Van Vort, Abortion Services in the United States, 1987 and 1988, 22
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 102, 106 (1990); see Stanley K. Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort,
Abortion Services in the United States, 1991 and 1992, 26 FAAI. PLAN. PERSP. 100,
103 (1994).
' For ease of reference, we use the term "anti-abortion protester," but vie do
so cautiously. Although many people who oppose abortion limit themselves to
peaceful protest, there are others whose goal is to stop abortions by any means
necessary, and characterizing them as protestors legitimates their unlawful conduct. See S. REP. No. 117, supra note 5, at 11 (Operation Rescue leader, stating:
"My desire would be to see abortion clinics stopped, closed ....
I would like to
see them closed down ....

Yes, absolutely." "We may not get laws changed or be
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brought First Amendment challenges to both. Thus, as the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently did in Pro-Choice
Network v. Schenck,' courts have considered the constitutionality of injunctions imposing protective buffer zones around
abortion clinics and prohibiting harassing conduct aimed at patients and clinic staff.8 Courts also have examined First
Amendment challenges to laws that protect abortion rights,
such as the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
("FACE"),9 and to ordinances creating buffer zones or banning
targeted picketing at clinic staffs residences."0

able to change people's in ... [blut if there is no one willing to conduct abortions, there are no abortions.").
7 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (in banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
See infra text accompanying notes 77-80.
' 18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (Supp. 1996). FACE prohibits the use of force, threat of
force or physical obstruction to injure, intimidate or interfere with the provision of
reproductive health care services. Id Anti-abortion activists have challenged FACE
on the grounds, inter alia, that it is content- and viewpoint-based and that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to enact it. Every appellate
court to consider the statute has upheld its constitutionality. See, e g., United
States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 1996 U.. LEXIS
7166 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1996); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996),
petition for cert. filed, No. 96-5615 (Aug. 6, 1996); United States v. Wilson, 73
F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995), cert denied sub norn. Skott v. United States, 65
U.S.L.W. 3242 (Oct 7, 1996); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995);
American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 65
(1995); Woodall v. Reno, 47 F.3d 656 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577
(1995). Two district courts have concluded that Congress did not have authority to
enact FACE under the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. One district court was reversed, United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621
(E.D. Wis. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995), and the other is on appeal.
Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791 (W.D.N.C.), appeal docheted, Nos. 95-1581, 961582, 96-1623 (4th Cir. 1996).
10 The State of Colorado and many municipalities have enacted buffer zone
laws to protect access to abortion clinics. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122
(1993); PHOENIX, ARIZ., CODE § 23-10.1 (1993); SANTA BARBARA, CAL, CODE § 9.99
(1993); SUNNYVALE, CAL., CODE, § 9.94 (1996); BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE § 5-310 (1986 & Revised May 5, 1987); PENSACOLA, FLA., CODE § 8-1-18 (1995). For a
discussion of case law analyzing the constitutionality of buffer zone ordinances, see
infra text accompanying notes 87.88.
In addition, many states and municipalities have enacted laws that prohibit
picketing of clinic staffs residences. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2909
(1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-225 (Michie 1995); MIN1. STAT. ANN. §
609.748(1)(c)(2) (West 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1317(e) (1995); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 715.49 (Baldwin 1995); SAN JOSE, CAL, CODE § 10.09.010 (1994); White
Bear, Minn., Ordinance No. 63 (May 21, 1990); FARGO, N.D., CODE §§ 10-0802 to
-0804 (1993); UPPER ARLINGTON, OHIO, ORDINANCES § 517.17 (1992); BARRINGTON,
R.I, ORDINANCE § 86-6 (1986); BROOKFIELD, WIS., GENERAL CODE § 9.17 (1985).
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In 1994, the Supreme Court addressed First Amendment
concerns in the abortion context in Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc." The Court enunciated a new test for contentneutral injunctions that restrict speech, holding that the injunctions must "burden no more speech than necessary to
serve a significant government interest." 2 The new standard
is more rigorous than the traditional time, place and manner
test that still applies to content-neutral statutes and ordinances that restrict speech."8 The Court imposed heightened scrutiny for injunctions because injunctions carry a greater risk of
censorship and discriminatory application than do statutes. 4
Under its new test, the Court in Madsen upheld some portions
of the disputed injunction and invalidated other provisions.' 5
The Second Circuit's decision in Schenck 6 is the first
Court of Appeals decision to evaluate an injunction under the
Madsen test. In Schenck, the Second Circuit, sitting in banc,
applied the Madsen test to uphold provisions in an injunction
protecting access to abortion clinics in the Western District of
New York. The injunction provided, inter alia, a fifteen-foot
buffer zone around clinic entrances and driveways and a fifteen-foot bubble zone around persons and vehicles entering or
leaving clinics (the "buffer/bubble zone"); it permitted two socalled "sidewalk counselors" to enter the fifteen-foot zones but
required them to cease further communication when requested
to do so (the "cease and desist" order). The Second Circuit's
analysis is particularly important in light of the Supreme
For a discussion of case law analyzing the constitutionality of residential picketing
ordinances, see infra text accompanying notes 81-85.
For a more detailed discussion of buffer zone and residential picketing laws,
see generally NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, DRAWING THE LINE: A
HANDBOOK FOR CREATING COMIUNITY RESIDENTIAL PICKETING AND BUFFER ZONE
LAWS (1996).
1 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).

Id. at 2525.
See infra text accompanying notes 37, 49-52 for a discussion of the legal
standards that apply to speech restrictions.
' Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524.
11 For a more detailed discussion of the Court's analysis in Madsen and a
comparison to Schenck, see infra text accompanying notes 48-80.
16 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (in banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
In the two years since it was decided, most of the cases citing Madsen have involved anti-abortion protest at reproductive health care facilities. The Madsen
standard does apply, however, to any injunction that restricts speech, such as in a
labor dispute.
12
13
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Court's grant of certiorari to hear the case in its 1996-97 term.
Significantly, the Court decided to review Schenck less than
two years after its decision in Madsen. Because Schenck was
the first court of appeals decision to apply the Madsen standard, the Court granted certiorari in the absence of any conflict among the circuits on the application of Madsen.
Part One of this Article describes the district court opinions in Schenck, which pre-date Madsen, and then discusses
the Madsen opinion and its impact on the case law. Part Two
then addresses the Second Circuit panel decision and in bane
opinions in Schenck, which applied the Madsen standard. The
in banc Schenck decision, with its five separate opinions, is the
most thoroughly reasoned decision analyzing free speech in the
abortion context since Madsen. The in banc opinions flesh out
some of the issues left open in Madsen and also raise new
concerns. Part Three analyzes two of these issues. First, we
examine what sort of factual record is necessary to support an
injunction. We propose that although a detailed factual record
is necessary for a speech-restrictive injunction, the failure of a
prior injunction should not be a prerequisite because such a
requirement would unduly hamper the district judge's discretion to remedy violations of law. Second, we explore the captive
audience doctrine as a further support for speech-restrictive
injunctions where medical patients seeking to exercise a constitutionally protected right cannot practically escape unwanted
harassing or obstructive conduct. This Article concludes that
Judge Oakes's majority opinion best protects women seeking
reproductive health care while preserving free expression
rights.

I. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN PRO-CHOICE NETWORK

V.

SCHENCK
A. The District Court Temporary Restraining Order and
PreliminaryInjunctionDecisions
The Schenck case was brought in September 1990 by several plaintiffs: Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, a
not-for-profit corporation aimed at maintaining safe and legal
access to family planning and abortion services; and clinics and
doctors located in western New York that offered family plan-
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ning and gynecological services, including abortions. Plaintiffs
sued Operation Rescue, Project Rescue Western New York and
Project Life of Rochester, as well as fifty individuals, in order
to enjoin a "blockade" of a reproductive health facility to take
place four days later. 7 District Judge Richard J. Arcara of the
Western District of New York issued a temporary restraining
order ("TRO") enjoining the defendants from "trespassing on,
sitting in, blocking, impeding or obstructing access to"18 any
reproductive health facility in the Western District of New
York, "including demonstrating within 15 feet of any person
seeking access to or leaving such facilities," 19 and from "physically abusing or tortiously harassing"" any patients or clinic
workers at those facilities.2 The TRO exempted "sidewalk
counseling, consisting of a conversation of a nonthreatening
nature by not more than two people,"22 and also stated that
once a person indicates that she does not wish to be counseled,
the protestors must "cease and desist" from "counseling."23
The defendants complied with the TRO by refraining from blockading, yet still demonstrated on the announced day. The
court, with the defendants' consent, ordered that the TRO
remain in effect until it decided the plaintiffs' motion to convert the TRO into a preliminary injunction.' During the one
and a half years that the motion was pending, plaintiffs experienced repeated violations of the TRO' and filed motions for

17 The plaintiffs asserted one federal cause of action, conspiracy to infringe on
the constitutional rights of women seeking abortion under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1984), and six state law claims: (1) violation of N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c
(McKinney 1992) and N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993); (2) tortious interference with business; (3) trespass; (4) intentional infliction of emotional harm; (5)
tortious harassment; and (6) false imprisonment. Schenck, 67 F.3d at 381-82.
18 Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, Civ. 90 No. 1004A, 511(a) (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 1990) [hereinafter TRO].

19 Id.
20
21

Id. I 1(b).
Id.

2Id.

2' TRO,

I (b). The TRO also enjoined the defendants from "making any excessively loud sound which disturbs, injures, or endangers the health or safety of any
patient or employee" and from "attempting, or inducing, encouraging, directing,
aiding, or abetting" others to engage in prohibited conduct. Id.
24 Pro Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1423 (W.D.N.Y.
1992).
' Numerous witnesses testified to blocking, obstructing and harassment by
anti-choice protesters that occurred despite the TRO. See Joint Appendix to Second
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civil contempt against six individuals. After conducting trials
on these contempt charges, the court found that all six individuals had violated the TRO." The contempt violations included
conduct such as blocking and obstructing clinic entrances,
impeding cars and patients trying to enter the clinic and stalking patients as they approached the clinicY
On February 14, 1992, Judge Arcara granted the plaintiffs'
motion and converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction." In issuing the preliminary injunction, the court relied
on a hearing held from March 6, 1991, to April 1, 1991, as well
as hearings on five of the contempt motions held intermittently
from February 1991 through January 1992. Because the defendants stipulated that the court could enjoin physical blockades,
the district court's decision granting the preliminary injunction
focused on "constructive blockades," which involved "demonstrating and picketing around the entrances of the clinics,"c'
and on "sidewalk counseling," which involved protestors approaching patients and attempting to dissuade them from
having abortions."
In its order granting the injunction the district court made
extensive findings of fact. It found that constructive blockades

Circuit In Banc Rehearing, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (in banc), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 1260 (1996) (the testimony of patient escorts Deborah Warnes, Elizabeth
Sholes, health care counselor Susan Ward, and Marilyn Buckham, Executive Director of Women services).
See Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 828 F. Supp. 1018, 1028-29
(W.D.N.Y. 1993).
27

Id.

"Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. 1417. The court issued the injunction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1984) and two pendent state law claims under N.Y.
CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c (McKinney 1992) and trespass. The court declined to address whether the injunction should issue under Pro-Choice Network's four other
state law claims. Due to the pendency of appeals, the district court has refrained
from making the injunction permanent.

"Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1424.
ID Id. During the spring of 1992, after the court issued the preliminary injunction, hundreds of anti-abortion protesters converged on Buffalo to take part in the
so-called "Spring of Life." Pro-Choice Network, 828 F. Supp. at 1029. The 'Spring
of Life" blockades shut down many clinics for days and led to hundreds of arrests.
See, e.g., Michael Beebe, Arrests Profiled, BUFFALO NEWS, May 27, 1992, at B;
Robert J. McCarthy & Phil Fairbanks, 600 Demonstrate Outside Four Clinics,
BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 21, 1992, at Al; Gene Warner, 71 Pro-Lifers Arrested at City
Clinic, BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 24, 1992, at AL The protests led to criminal contempt guilty pleas by five of the blockade leaders. In re Slovenee, 799 F. Supp.
1441 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
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resulted in patients having to run a "gauntlet of harassment
and intimidation, ...

[that diemonstrators

frequently and

routinely congregate[d] in or near the driveway entrances...
[made] loud and disruptive noises... yell[ed] at patients,
patient escorts and medical staff... [and] crowd[ed] around
people trying to enter the facilities in an intimidating and
obstructive manner."3 The court also found that "sidewalk
counseling" "often erupt[ed] into a charged encounter... [and
that tihe 'counselors'.

.

. turn[ed] to harassing, badgering,

intimidating and yelling at the patients and patient escorts...
[and] continue[d] to do so even after the patients signalled]
their desire to be left alone." 2 The court stated that the harassment and intimidation caused stress and sometimes physical injury to patients and staff.33 The protestors' conduct
sometimes so intimidated and confused patients that they
could not enter the clinic, thereby suffering a delay in obtaining medical care. Even if the patients were able to survive the
gauntlet, they "usually enter[ed] the medical facilities visibly
shaken and severely distressed."' The district court found
that "stress and anxiety can cause patients to: 1) have elevated
blood pressure; 2) hyperventilate; 3) require sedation; or 4)
require special counseling and attention before they [can] obtain health care."35 Patients may become so agitated that they
either are unable to undergo the scheduled medical procedure
or cannot lie still in the operating room, thereby increasing the
surgical risk.36
Based on these facts, the district court issued an injunction that was similar, but not identical to, the TRO. The district court applied the then-controlling time, place and manner
test for content neutral speech restrictions." That standard is

Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1424.
Id. at 1425.
33 Id. at 1427.
34 Id.
35 Id.
316Pro Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1427.
' Id. at 1433-37. For example, in upholding a municipal noise regulation under
that test, the Supreme Court held that it was a reasonable time, place and manner restriction because it was content-neutral, was narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and left open alternative channels for
communication. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989), reh'g
denied, 492 U.S. 937 (1989); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
31
32
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considered to be an "intermediate" one, midway between the
rational basis test applied to government regulation of
nonspeech activities' and the strict scrutiny test applied to
content-based regulations, which requires that a statute be
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.3" Applying the test, the court
found that the injunction was constitutional under the time,
place and manner test, because it was narrowly tailored to
serve the significant governmental interests of safeguarding
health, public safety and balancing the constitutional rights to
abortion and free speech,40 and because it left open ample alternative channels for communication."
The injunction renewed the TRO's prohibition of trespassing on, sitting in, blocking, impeding or obstructing access at
abortion clinics.42 It also renewed the TRO's prohibition of
demonstrating within fifteen feet of persons seeking access to
or leaving clinics (the "bubble zone"), modifying it to apply also
to vehicles. 3 The preliminary injunction added a prohibition
of demonstrating within fifteen feet of clinic entrances or driveways (the "buffer zone")." In addition, the injunction refined
the TRO's ban on "physically abusing or tortiously harassing"
by replacing it with a prohibition of "physically abusing, grabbing, touching, pushing, shoving, or crowding." 5 Finally, the
preliminary injunction renewed the exemption for two "sidewalk counselors" to enter the fifteen-foot buffer/bubble zone
and clarified that the "cease and desist" provision required
protestors to withdraw fifteen feet once someone indicates a
desire not to be "counseled."46 Two defendants, Reverend Paul

See, eg., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
"Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
'o Pro-ChoiceNetwork, 799 F. Supp. at 1433.
41 I&. at 1437 (stating that defendants 'can still picket, carry signs, pray, sing
or chant in full view of people going into the clinics or just passing by").
1I2&

at 1440.

1 Id. The court settled on a distance of 15 feet based on the fact that 15 feet
is less than two car lengths and provides a safe turning radius for cars. Transcript of Proceedings at 36, Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, No. 90 Civ.
1004A (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1990).
" Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1440.
4I5&
4Id.
The injunction also refined the TRO's ban on excessive noise to prohibit
the use of "any mechanical loudspeaker or sound amplification device or raking
any excessively loud sound," and renewed the TRO's aiding and abetting provision.
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Schenck and Dwight Saunders, appealed Judge Arcara's decision granting the preliminary injunction to the Second Circuit.47 They also are the respondents in the Supreme Court

case.
B. The Impact of the United States Supreme Court Decision in
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.
After the Schenck appeal was argued but before the Second Circuit issued its original panel decision, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Madsen v. Women's Health Center,
Inc.,' which changed the constitutional standard for evaluating content-neutral injunctions that restrict speech. Previously,
injunctions had been measured under the time, place and manner test used for content neutral speech restrictions. The new
standard announced in Madsen-that an injunction "must not
burden any more speech than necessary to serve a significant
government interest' 4 --is assertedly more rigorous than the
time, place and manner test. 0 The difference in the wording
of the test is slight. Both tests require a significant government interest. The time, place and manner test requires that
the restriction be "narrowly tailored," while the Madsen test
51
requires that it "burden no more speech than necessary."
However the test is labelled, it is clear that under the Madsen
injunction standard each provision must be justified by specific
facts in the record.52
Id. at 1440-41.
" That appeal was consolidated with another appeal filed by all defendants
from the district court's decision refusing to vacate the preliminary injunction. ProChoice Network v. Project Rescue, 828 F. Supp. 1018 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
" 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
41

Id. at 2524 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980)).

50 See id. ("standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigoros").
81

Justice Scalia characterized the majority's new standard as "intermediate-

intermediate scrutiny," and complained that the difference between the time, place
and manner test and the Madsen test "is frankly too subtle for me to describe."
Id. at 2537.
82 It is worth noting that recently the Court has been adopting "intermediate"
tests that emphasize the importance of facts and are less outcome-determinative
than previous tests. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(adopting "undue burden" test for abortion restrictions). Common to these tests is
that the outcome is not determined by the test, as it historically has been with
strict scrutiny, for example, which almost always invalidates a challenged restric-
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Madsen was a challenge to an injunction prohibiting certain activities outside a Florida reproductive health services
clinic and the residences of clinic staff. After anti-abortion
protestors ignored an injunction restraining them from interfering with public access to the clinic, the court amended the
injunction better to protect clinic access and ensure the safety
of patients, potential patients and staff of the clinic. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the amended injunction in Madsen
against the protestors' claims that it violated their First
Amendment right to freedom of speech." The U.S. Supreme
Court then granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the
Florida Supreme Court's decision and a decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals regarding a separate challenge
to the same injunction." The Supreme Court afirmed in part
and reversed in part the Florida Court's decision.' Specifically, the Court first held that the injunction was content-neutral
even though it applied only to the conduct of anti-abortion
protestors.5 The Court noted that the injunction regulated
only anti-abortion protestors' behavior because only they had
engaged in unlawful conduct.5 7
The Court then enunciated its new test for evaluating the
constitutionality of content-neutral injunctions, stating that
injunctions "must burden no more speech than necessary to
serve a significant government interest."' In deciding that a
more rigorous test was appropriate for injunctions than the

tion. But see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding content-based
buffer zone around polling places under strict scrutiny).
Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla.
1993).
Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993).
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion in Madsen and was joined by
Justices Blackimun, O'Connor, Souter and Ginsberg. Justice Stevens joined parts of
the opinion and filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Justice Stevens argued for a more lenient standard regarding First Amendment
scrutiny of injunctions and would have upheld the Florida court's amended injunction. Justice Souter filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice Scalia filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part In the dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined, Justice Scalia argued
that speech-restricting injunctions deserve the same strict level of scrutiny as is
given to content-based statutes. Justice Scalia dissented from each part of the
majority opinion that upheld provisions of the injunction.
" Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct 2516, 2524 (1994).
57 Id
5Id.

at 2525.
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time, place and manner test used for statutes, the Court elaborated on the difference between injunctions and statutes. 9 It
noted that ordinances are enacted by the legislature for the
"promotion of particular societal interests," while injunctions
are "remedies imposed for violations (or threatened violations)
of a legislative or judicial decree. " ' ° Because of this difference,
injunctions "carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application . . . ."' However, the Court also observed that
injunctions have an advantage over statutes "in that they can
be tailored by a trial judge to afford more precise relief
"62

In applying its new test, the Court stated that the injunction at issue satisfied five significant governmental interests:
protecting women's freedom to seek medical services in connection with a pregnancy; ensuring public safety and order; facilitating the orderly flow of street traffic outside clinics; protecting property rights; and promoting medical privacy of patients
in a clinic." Subsequent courts interpreting Madsen, including the opinions in Schenck,' have relied on the same state
" Id. at 2524-25; see Amicus Curiae Brief of The American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO") (filed in support of neither
party in Madsen) (discussing difference between general legislation and judge-created injunctions and presenting analysis later reflected in the Madsen decision),
Madsen (No. 93-880).
£0 Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524.
61

Id.

In formulating its new standard, the Madsen Court took the middle road
between Justice Stevens, who advocated for a more lenient standard for injunctions, and Justice Scalia, who argued for a strict scrutiny standard. Noting similar
differences between injunctions and statutes as did the majority, Justice Stevens
nonetheless concluded that injunctions should be subjected to a less rigorous standard than legislation. Id. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see Amicus Curiae Brief of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Madsen (No. 93-880). Justice Stevens reasoned that because an injunction applies
only to those who have engaged in illegal activity and, as a result, must prevent
future recurrences of illegal activity, the injunction may be more restrictive of
repeat violators than a law would be on the community at large. Madsen, 114 S.
Ct. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). On the other
end of the spectrum, Justice Scalia asserted that all speech-restricting injunctions
should be subjected to strict scrutiny. Id. at 2538 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). It is procedurally more difficult to challenge injunctions
than statutes, and individual judges "chagrined by prior disobedience" may reach
too far in restricting speech, Scalia reasoned. Id. at 2539 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526.
,See infra text accompanying notes 97, 141. Subsequent to Madsen, some
62 Id.
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interests, often emphasizing one or another.' Using its new
test, the Court then looked to whether each aspect of the Florida injunction burdened more speech than necessary in accomplishing these interests. Two aspects of the Madsen injunction
are particularly pertinent for Schenck: the thirty-six foot buffer
zone, which the Court upheld in part, and the 300-foot "noapproach" zone, which the Court invalidated.' Although the

courts, including the Second Circuit in Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d
377, 389 (2d Cir. 1995) (in banc), cert. granted, 116 S. CL 1260 (1996), have described the Court in Madsen as having identified only three government interests. In
doing so, those courts have collapsed three different interests into the one of "public safety." See id. at 387. But see id. at 398 (Jacobs, J., concurring) (the Madsen
Court "invoked broader state interests in public safety and the right to travel").
This Article identifies five interests in the belief that the interests on which the
Madsen Court relied in promoting the free flow of traffic and protecting property
rights are related to, but distinct from, public safety.
See, e.g., National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 655
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (injunction serves significant governmental interests "virtually
identical to those in Madsen"); United States v. Dinwiddie, 885 F. Supp. 1286,
1295 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (failure to grant injunction would 'jeopardize the lives and
safety of persons receiving and engaging in reproductive health services), affd in
part, remanded in part, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, No. 965615 (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996); Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams, 898
P.2d 402, 410 (Cal. 1995) (buffer zone necessary to protect patient safety and
health as well as to protect access), petition for cert. filied, 64 USL.W. 3287 (U.S.
Oct. 6, 1995) (No. 95-576); Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Blythe, 39 Cal. Rptr.
2d 189, 199 (Cal. CL App. 1995) (buffer zone serves state interests of protecting
property rights of clinic, health and safety of patients, and privacy rights of patients), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 514 (1995).
The Court upheld the injunction's noise restrictions during surgical hours
and invalidated a restriction against images observable inside the clinic. Madsn,
114 S. Ct at 2528-29. The noise restriction prohibited singing, chanting, whistling,
shouting, using bullhorns, auto horns or other sounds within earshot of patients
inside the clinic during surgical hours. Id at 2528. Patients and their families
need a restful atmosphere, the Court stated, and medical facilities should not be
forced to undertake extraordinary efforts to provide such an environment. Id. Noting that it previously had upheld similar noise restrictions in areas around
schools, the Court held that the limited noise restrictions imposed by the injunction satisfied its new test and burdened no more speech than necessary to ensure
the well-being of clinic patients. Id.
The Court invalidated the prohibition on images observable to patients inside
the clinic, holding that such a 'blanket ban" burdens more speech than necessary
to protect clinic patients and their families. Id. at 2529. The Court reasoned that
it is easier for clinics to close their curtains than it is for a patient to stop up her
ears. Id.
Although the Court also struck down a provision that created a 300-foot protective zone around the residences of clinic staff, because the particular facts presented in Madsen did not justify the creation of the 300-foot zone, the Court upheld the right of courts generally to grant injunctios protecting the residences of
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Court had not previously considered provisions like the "no approach"
zone, it had upheld statutes mandating buffer
67
zones.

The Madsen Court upheld the use of the thirty-six foot
buffer zone only around areas of clinic property used for access
to and from the facility and for automobile traffic, and struck
down the zone around all other parts of clinic property.' The
Court relied in part on a videotape showing anti-abortion activists impeding clinic access and blocking automobile traffic near
the clinic driveway.69 The Court also noted that the state
court seemed to have "few other options" than to impose the
buffer zone, that protestors could still be seen and heard from
beyond the zone, and that the failure of earlier narrower injunctions without a buffer zone could be taken into consideration in adjudicating the constitutionality of the broader injunction at issue.7" The Court concluded: "On balance, we hold
that the thirty-six foot buffer zone around the clinic entrance
and driveway burdens no more speech than necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at stake."7 The Court
struck down the provision imposing a 300-foot "no approach"
zone, which prohibited protestors within 300 feet of the clinic
from approaching any person who was seeking clinic services
unless that person indicated a desire to communicate.7" The
Court reasoned that the provision burdened more speech than
necessary because it prohibited all uninvited approaches, even
peaceful ones.73 The Court noted that "citizens must tolerate

those who provide reproductive health services. Id. at 2529-30. Reaffirming its
decision in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988), the Court stated that
"[t]he State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the
home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society." Madsen, 114
S. Ct. at 2530.
67 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding 100-foot buffer
zone around voting sites); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (upholding prohibition on three or more people congregating within 500 feet of foreign embassies);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (upholding prohibition of picketing within
100 feet of courthouse).
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
"

70

Id.
Id.

at 2527.

Id.
Id. at 2530.
" Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.

71

72
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insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide
adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the
First Amendment."74
Because Madsen was decided only two years ago, its impact on injunctions in general remains unclear." It is clear,
however, that the Madsen standard requires courts to undertake a careful examination of the facts supporting each injunction provision. For example, as discussed more fully below, the
Court upheld the parts of the thirty-six foot buffer zone around
the clinic's driveway and entrances, but struck down the zone
where it reached to private property on the back and side of
the clinic, because there had been no showing that "petitioners'
activities on the private property ha[d] obstructed access to the
clinic."76 Thus far, the Madsen standard has not caused a
large number of courts to strike down speech-restrictive injunctions around reproductive health care facilities that previously
were justified under the time, place and manner test. When
courts have reexamined pre-Madsen injunctions in light of the
new standard, some have made minor modifications to the
injunctions,77 while others have found it unnecessary to alter

"' Id. at 2529 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)). Judge Winters
decision in the Second Circuit in banc rehearing of Schenck stands in tension with
this statement in Madsen, in that Judge Winter advocates restricting speech targeted at certain locations that cannot easily be avoided. See Pro-Choice Network v.
Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 395 (2d Cir. 1995) (in bane), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260
(1996) (Winter, J., concurring in the result); infra text accompanying notes 123137.
7' Courts analyzing injunctions in other contexts have not engaged in an extensive analysis in applying Madsen. See, e.g., In re Andrus, 189 Ba. 413 (Bankr.
N.D. IMl. 1995) (applying Madsen to speech restrictive injunction in bankruptcy
discharge order); People v. Acuna, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (applying Madsen to injunction based on public nuisance law regulating gang activity); Richardson v. City of Rutland, No. C.NA. 95-094, 1995 WL 672645, at *4 (Vt.
Nov. 3, 1995) (applying Madsen to injunction in zoning context).
' Madsen, 114 S. CL at 2528.
See, eg., National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 654-58
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that all aspects of injunction pass muster under Madsen,
except that the terms inducing and =encouraging are too vague, and thus directing district court to replace them with the term 'incitingn); Women's Choice of
Bergen County v. Doe, No. A-5102-94T1, slip op. at 3-9 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div.
Apr. 25, 1996) (finding that injunction's buffer zone complies with Madsen but
modifying injunction in light of Madsen to allow two 'sidewalk counselors" into the
zone and requiring them to cease and desist when asked to do so, and to apply
noise provision only to sounds interfering with the provision of medical services);
Lawson v. Murray, 649 A.2d 1253 (N.J. 1994) (modifying residential picketing
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the injunctions.7" As discussed below, in finding that neither
the fifteen-foot buffer/bubble zone nor the cease and desist
provision burden more speech than necessary, the Second Circuit80 in banc decision in Schenck79 falls into the latter category

While Madsen's effect on injunction cases remains unsettled, it already has had a dramatic and perhaps unexpected
effect on cases involving speech-restricting ordinances, particularly in the residential picketing context. For example, the
Sixth and the Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals relied on
Madsen to strike down legislative prohibitions of residential
picketing." Notwithstanding the fact that six years before
Madsen the Supreme Court upheld a residential picketing ordi-

injunction in light of Madsen by reducing 300-foot buffer zone to 100 feet, restricting the number of picketers, frequency and duration of picketing, and requiring police notification), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2264 (1995); Horizon Health Ctr. v.
Felicissimo, 659 A.2d 1387, 1390-91 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (modifying
injunction to allow four rather than two "sidewalk counselors," to allow two "sidewalk counselors" into 36-foot buffer zone, and adding cease and desist provision),
cert. denied, 667 A.2d 191 (N.J. 1995).
7"See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams, 898 P.2d 402,
408-12 (Cal. 1995) (buffer zone requiring anti-abortion protestors to conduct protests across the street, approximately 60 feet from clinic, passes muster under
Madsen), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3287 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1995) (No. 95-576);
Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Blythe, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 189, 201 (Cal. Ct. App.)
("speech free" zone, consisting of 20 feet on either side of clinic door, passes
Madsen test), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 514 (1995).
79 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (in banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
"8 Since Madsen, other courts also have upheld injunctions providing buffer
zones around clinics. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Baunmann, 532 N.W.2d 144 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1995) (upheld permanent injunction creating 25-foot buffer zone). In addition,
other courts since Madsen have granted injunctions under FACE, creating buffer
zones against only one or two defendants. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d
913 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding permanent injunction ordering Dinwiddie to stay
500 feet away from any facility that provides reproductive health services, with
exception for legitimate personal activity), petition for cert. filed, No. 96-5616 (U.S.
Aug. 6, 1996); United States v. Lindgren, 883 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.D. 1995)
(granting preliminary injunction ordering defendant, Brennan, to stay 100 feet
away from the clinic, the clinic employees, and the employees' homes).
81 See Kirkeby v. Furness, 52 F.3d 772, 774-75 (8th Cir. 1995) (striking down
prohibition of "targeted residential picketing" within 200 feet of residential dwellings in light of Madsen), appeal after remand, 92 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1996);
Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 43 F.3d 1100, 1104-07 (6th Cir.) (striking
down city ordinance's ban on "picketing before or about" residences or dwellings on
grounds that it was "inconsistent" with Madsen), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2276
(1995).
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nance in Frisby v. Schultz,' the Sixth and Eighth Circuits
found that, in striking down the injunction provision prohibiting picketing, demonstrating or using sound amplification
within 300 feet of the clinic staffs residences,' Madsen
changed the legal landscape on residential picketing.' Although the Eighth Circuit specifically acknowledged that
"Madsendid not involve an ordinance, but an injunction, which
the Supreme Court explicitly judged under a stricter standard,"' it nevertheless followed the Sixth Circuit in blurring
the distinction between ordinances and injunctions in order to
strike down the ordinance at issue. In a subsequent case, however, another panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals took
a different approach from the panel in Kirkeby, and correctly
applied the time, place and manner test to uphold a residential
ordinance." While some courts, including the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, have correctly refused to apply Madsen to
ordinances,"7 other courts have erroneously applied Mfadsen's
'2

487 U.S. 474 (1988).
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2529-30 (1994).

"Madsen . .. makes it clear that any linear extension beyond the area 'solely in front of a particular residence' is at best suspect, if not prohibited outright.!
Vittitow, 43 F.3d at 1105; see Kirkeby, 52 F.3d at 775 (Vittitow court's reading of
Madsen was "not obviously wrong and, indeed, has much to recommend it'); cf
Veneklase v. City of Fargo, No. 95-1515, 116 U.S. App. LEXIS 3680, at *9-*10
(8th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). The Court in Madsen distinguished Frisby in two ways.
First, it found the 300-foot zone at issue larger than the "zone" in Frisby, although rather than specifying a specific distance, the ordinance at issue in Frisby
prohibited picketing "before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual"
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 477. Second, the Court noted that, unlike the ordinance in
Frisby, the provision at issue "would ban 'general marching through residential
neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of an entire block of houses."
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529 (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483); see Vittitow, 43 F.3d
at 1111 (Martin, J., dissenting) (criticizing Madsen for characterizing Frisby as
providing a 'zone").
Klrkeby, 52 F.3d at 775.
' Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511, 1519-20 (8th Cir. 1996).
' See Sabelko v. City of Phoenix, 68 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting argument that Madsen standard applies to buffer zone ordinance and correctly applying
time, place, manner test to uphold challenged provisions), petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3625 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1996) (No. 95-1415); City of San Jose v. Superior
Court of Santa Clara County, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing that Madsen test does not apply to city ordinance prohibiting picketing within
300 feet of any residence), cert denied sub nora. Thompson v. City of San Jose,
116 S. Ct. 340 (1995); Conroy v. City of Pensacola, No. 95-257-CA-01, slip opinion
at 3-4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 11, 1995) (refusing to enjoin eight-foot buffer zone because city ordinance is a valid time, place and manner restriction, and protestors
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injunction test for ordinances, thus obscuring the previously
clear test for ordinances. The Supreme Court may clarify this
issue in Schenck or, if it decides to review the Ninth Circuit
decision upholding an ordinance, in Sabelko v. City of Phoenix.'
C. The OriginalSecond CircuitPanel Schenck Decision
In September 1994, the Second Circuit issued a 2-1 panel
decision in Schenck, upholding all aspects of the injunction
except for the fifteen-foot buffer/bubble zone and the cease and
desist order.8 9 Rather than applying the time, place and manner standard used by the district court, the Second Circuit
applied the new Madsen test, because Madsen had been decided in July 1994, after the Schenck appeal had been briefed and
argued. In an opinion written by Judge Meskill and joined by
Judge Altimari, the court determined that the fifteen-foot buffer zone around clinic entrances and driveways, the fifteen-foot
bubble zone around people and vehicles and the "cease and
desist" provision burdened more speech than necessary under
the Madsen analysis.' The court upheld all of the other injunction provisions. 9' Judge Oakes dissented in part, voting to
uphold the entire injunction.92
D. The Second CircuitIn Banc Schenck Decision
The Second Circuit heard Schenck in banc, limiting consideration to the issues of the fifteen-foot buffer/bubble zone and
the cease and desist provision, the same issues before the Supreme Court. On September 28, 1995, the Second Circuit held,

can still be seen and heard).
8 68 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3625 (U.S.
Mar. 4, 1996) (No. 95-1415). A petition for certiorari is also pending in a case
which upheld a state law that provided for a 100-foot buffer zone and an eightfoot bubble zone under the Madsen test. Hill v. City of Lakewood, No. 94CA0856,
1995 WL 411983 (Colo. Ct. App. July 13, 1995), cert. denied, No. 95SC593 (Colo.
Feb. 26, 1996), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Hill v. Colorado, 64 U.S.L.W. 3808
(U.S. May 24, 1996) (No. 95-1905).
Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1994).
9 Id. at 371-72.
91 Id. at 374.
9 Id.
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by a 13-2 vote, that those two provisions were constitutional
under Madsen.93 The decision consists of five separate opinions. Judge Oakes wrote the decision labeled the majority
m ' Judge Winopinion, which was joined by eight other judges
ter wrote a "concurring" opinion that garnered nine votes,.
including six of the judges who joined the Oakes opinion."
Judge Jacobs, joined by Judge Mahoney, concurred separately;,
each also joined the Winter opinion. Judges Meskill and
Altimari, who had comprised the panel majority striking down
the provisions, each wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
1. Judge Oakes's Opinion
The Oakes opinion applied Madsen in a straightforward
manner, finding state interests that were similar to those the
Court found significant,' and analyzing the fifteen-foot buffer/bubble zone and the cease and desist provision in light of
the Supreme Court's treatment of the thirty-six foot buffer
zone and the 300-foot "no approach" zones in Madsen. Judge
Oakes .upheld the fifteen-foot buffer/bubble zone because he
agreed with the district court that it was supported by the
governmental interest in ensuring access to clinics as well as
the safe performance of abortions."3
In analyzing whether the buffer zone burdened more
speech than necessary under the Madsen standard, Judge
Oakes compared the Schenck buffer zone to the one upheld in
Madsen, finding it to be both more and less restrictive. The
Madsen zone was more restrictive than the buffer zone in

Pro-Choice Network v. Schenk, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (in bane), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct 1260 (1996).
Judge Oakes's opinion was joined by Judges Newman, Kearse, Miner, Walker, Leval, Calabresi, Cabranes and Parker.
Judge Winter's opinion was joined by Judges Newman, Kearse, Mahoney,
McLaughlin, Jacobs, Walker, Leval, Calabresi and Cabranes.
Even though Judge Oakes's opinion is the majority, it was in fact joined by
one less judge than Judge Winter's concurring opinion. Judge Oakes opinion is
considered the majority opinion because it mustered a majority before Judge
Winter's concurring opinion did so. See Letter from George Lange MI,Clerk of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, July 2, 1996. Rather than
using the terms "majority" or "concurrence," we will refer to the opinions as the
"Oakes" opinion and the "Wintee opinion, respectively.
Schenck, 67 F.3d at 387.
88

Id. at 389.
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Schenck because it extended thirty-six feet and did not allow
any protestors within it, while the Schenck zone was only fifteen feet and allowed for two sidewalk counselors to enter the
zone.99 The Madsen zone was otherwise less restrictive, however, because it did not move with the protestors, whereas the
Schenck injunction provided for a fifteen-foot moving bubble
zone protecting persons or vehicles approaching or leaving the
clinic.0 ° Judge Oakes concluded that the buffer/bubble zone
in Schenck was justified by the factual record, analogizing it to
the "arguably more restrictive buffer zone [imposed in Madsen]
on the basis of a record comparable to that considered by the
district court in this case." 10'
Rejecting the argument made by the defendants and in
Judge Meskill's dissent that the buffer/bubble zone was not
necessary because the interests served by it were already met
through the provisions of the injunction banning obstruction,
Judge Oakes emphasized the need to protect patients entering
or leaving a medical facility. Judge Oakes stated: "[In crafting
the injunction, the Court has been guided by the paramount
need to maintain an atmosphere conducive to the health care
functions of plaintiffs' facilities."' 2 Medical safety also justifies protecting those leaving the clinic who "may consequently
be in a medically vulnerable state.""3 Relying on the district
court's finding that "defendants' noisy, disruptive, invasive,
threatening and intimidating activities"O° had severe medical
repercussions, Judge Oakes found that the buffer zone was
necessary to ensure "medical safety,"' 5 because other provi-

0

Id. at 388.

100Id.

101 Id. Judge Oakes did not find persuasive the "dissent's recitation of distinctions between the record in the instant case and in Madsen." Id. He also rejected
the argument that the court could not impose a broader injunction because the
protestors had "generally complied" with the TRO: "[Niothing in Madsen states, or
even implies, that a TRO must fail before a broader injunction may be imposed."
Id. at 389. Rather, the failure of a prior injunction is one factor that a court may
consider. Id; see infra text accompany notes 168-178. Interestingly, Judge Oakes
did not explicitly take note of the numerous post-TRO violations in Schenck, including the five contempts.
1'2
Schenck, 67 F.3d at 389 (quoting Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799
F. Supp. 1417, 1433 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)).
103 Id.
:04Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1434.
"5

Id.
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sions in the injunction, such as the prohibitions against obstruction, were not sufficient to "maintain an atmosphere conducive to the health care functions of the plaintiffs facilities.' 06
Like the Court in Madsen,"° " Judge Oakes considered the
other ways that protestors could communicate. He noted that
because the buffer/bubble zone was only fifteen feet wide, defendants could "still picket, carry signs, pray, sing or chant in
full view of people going into the clinic or just passing by,"'
and within the zone the two sidewalk counselors could "engage
in individualized, face-to-face communication with persons entering the clinics." 9 Judge Oakes concluded that the buffer/bubble zone provision "ensure[d] that the injunction does not
hamper Project Rescue's message, only its intimidating method
of demonstration."" ° Thus, even though the district court had
issued the provision before Madsen, Judge Oakes found that
the zone did not burden more speech than necessary under the
new standard."'
In upholding the cease and desist provision, Judge Oakes
compared it to the 300-foot "no approach" zone struck down in
Madsen." Judge Oakes found that the cease and desist was
significantly less restrictive than the "categorical 'no-uninvitedapproach" zone in Madsen."' Under the Madsen provision,
even a patient who would like to hear the protestors' message
would not be able to do so unless she affirmatively sought it
out."4 In contrast, Schenck's cease and desist provision,
Id.
106
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2527 (1994). In
Madsen, the Court noted that protestors would be only ten to twelve feet away
from cars entering or leaving the clinic and that protestors "standing across the
narrow street from the clinic can still be seen and heard from the clinic parking
lots." Id.
107 Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359, 389 (2d Cir. 1994).
19 Id. In dissent, Judge Meskill criticized Judge Oakes on the ground that
consideration of alternative channels of communication 'is not controllinge under
Madsen, id. at 403, notwithstanding the fact that the Madsen Court stated that
the protestors there could be seen and heard from beyond the buffer zone.
Madsen, 114 S. Ct at 2527.
u"Schenck, 67 F.3d at 389.
,.Id. at 390.
112Id.
'" Id.
114 Id.
107
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which Judge Oakes termed the "walk away" provision,1 5 is
far more protective of speech because it allows protestors to
approach patients and simply gives the patients the right to
ask them to retreat."6 A protestor can continue to communicate from a distance of fifteen feet.11 7 A protester also can approach the next person to attempt "counseling," hand out leaflets or otherwise communicate." 8
Judge Oakes agreed with the district court that those
entering the clinic are a "captive audience," similar to residents in a home targeted by picketing. 9 Here, the fact that
patients enter the clinic to obtain needed medical services
creates a captive audience, as Madsen recognized.2 0 The
"walk-away" provision satisfies Madsen because it "provide[s] a
vulnerable group of medical patients with some relief from the
duress caused by unwelcome physical proximity to an extremely vocal group of demonstrators." 1 ' Thus, Judge Oakes concluded that the cease and desist order does not burden more
speech than necessary and is constitutional under Madsen.2 '
2. Judge Winter's Opinion
Judge Winter concurred in the judgment to uphold both
the fifteen-foot buffer/bubble zone and the cease and desist
provision. He wrote separately, however, in order to expand on
a principle that he claimed Judge Oakes actually relied on
without acknowledging it." Judge Winter maintained that
the First Amendment does not protect any "coercive or obstructionist conduct that intimidates or physically prevents individuals from going about ordinary affairs." 4 According to Judge
..Schenck, 67 F.3d at 391.
116 Id.

n Id. at 390-91.
..Id. at 391.
n9 Id. at 392; see Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
-2Madsen v. women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S.Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994) ("targeted
picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the psychological but the physical well-being of the patient held 'captive' by medical circumstance"); see infra
notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
" Schen k, 67 F.3d at 391-92; see Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is
There a Right Not to Be Spoken to?, 67 NW. U. L. REV. 153 (1972).
Schenck, 67 F.3d at 392-93.
' Id. at 394.
124 Id.
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Winter, the First Amendmentfs "marketplace of ideas" must
acknowledge the right of audience members to "be left free to
make up their own minds":
[Tihere is no right to invade the personal space of individuals going
about lawful business, to dog their footsteps or chase them down a
street, to scream or gesticulate in their faces, or to do anything else
that cannot fairly be described as an attempt at peaceful persuasion
....The timid have a right to go about their business, and it is no
embarrassment for a federal court to say so.'

Although he recognized that strong language, even epithets,
must be tolerated in general, Judge Winter distinguished between speech directed at the general public and speech targeting individuals at "location[s] that they can avoid only at a
cost."' Judge Winter clarified, however, that his limiting
principle is not restricted to situations involving a public forum
or a captive audience: "My point is that coercive or obstructionist conduct is not protected by the First Amendment in any
forum and regardless of the nature of the audience."m
Applying this principle, Judge Winter upheld the fifteenfoot buffer/bubble zone. He noted that here, the anti-abortion
protests were not directed at the general public, but rather, at
individuals who were clinic patients or staff and at locations
where these individuals had to pass in order to go about their
business.' Although he agreed with the dissent that the record in Madsen revealed a greater history of disruption than in
Schenck,' Judge Winter did not consider that factor to be
dispositive because his principle did not require an extensive
record and because a "15-foot buffer zone is not a significant
infringement upon speech."' Judge Winter also upheld the
cease and desist provision, because the record reflected that
some "sidewalk counselors" had "resorted to bullying,""3 and
the provision simply required them to adhere to the modest
fifteen-foot zone.132 Judge Winter also rejected the argument

Id at 396.
a'Id.

12

L Schenck, 67 F.3d at 397.
amId.

a Id.
"Id.

"'

Id. at 398.
Schenk, 67 F.3d at 398.
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that the court could not impose a more specific zone or the
cease and desist order because the protestors "generally (but
not entirely)" complied with the TRO. 33
Judge Winter's articulation of the right of individuals to go
about their business free from "coercive or obstructionist conduct that intimidates"" 4 can be characterized as an additional state interest to those set forth in Madsen.'3 5 More precisely, however, it is a way to take certain conduct, with its expressive elements, outside of the First Amendment altogether. ' 6 Although Judge Winter acknowledged that the other
interests identified in Madsen also are significant, he emphasized that his principle alone is sufficient for an injunction:
"[C]oercion or obstruction does not gain First Amendment protection simply because no one is physically injured, traffic
moves, and private property is not invaded." 37
3. Judge Jacobs's Opinion
Judge Jacobs wrote a separate concurring opinion because
he believed that Judge Oakes's opinion framed the government
interests "so narrowly ... as to be message specific," applying
only to "the regulation of anti-abortion protest." 8' In particular, Judge Jacobs took issue with describing the governmental
interests "in terms of vulnerable and agitated patients," 3 9
which may be too narrow and function to "squelch only one
side of a single controversy." 40 Like the Supreme Court in
Madsen, Judge Jacobs invoked the broader governmental interest in 4 protecting public safety, traffic flow and property
rights.1 '

'"

Id.

at 398 n.1.

Id. at 394.
"
See id. at 396-97 (Winter, J., concurring) (in addition to "protecting targets
of protest from coercive or obstructionist conduct . . . [the] state has other interests").
1sG See id. at 397 (Winter, J., concurring).
u"Schenck, 67 F.3d at 397.

"18 Id.

Id.
140 Id.

at 398.

139

. Id. at 398-99; see infra text accompanying notes 138-139. Judge Jacobs
mischaracterized Judge Oakes's opinion, which, in fact, did invoke other governmental interests.
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Although the interests identified by Judge Oakes parallel
the Madsen interests,' Judge Jacobs characterized Judge
Oakes's opinion as relying on only two government interests:
protecting "vulnerable and agitated patients seeking a potentially dangerous medical procedure in the tranquil precincts of
a clinic"; and "preserving abortion rights.""" Judge Jacobs
pointed out that the Madsen opinion also cited interests in
public safety and the right to travel.'" Judge Jacobs' criticism is misplaced. It is true that Judge Oakes elaborated on
the need to protect medical safety,"' as have other courts
subsequent to Madsen."' A state interest in preserving tranquility for medical patients, however, is not message specific to
anti-abortion protest but instead is a traditional reason for
limiting expression, as exemplified by ordinances prohibiting
noise around hospitals."7
4. Judge Meskill's Opinion
Judges Meskill and Altimari, who comprised the majority
in the original panel, each wrote dissents to the in banc opinion. Judge Meskill's fundamental disagreement with the Oakes
opinion is that it "ignores" or "misstates" the record." He
1 As noted above, Judge Oakes also identified and relied on state interests in
"public safety" and "rights to travel." Schenck, 67 F.3d at 387.
13 Id. at 398. Judge Jacobs opined that reliance on those interests was particularly tenuous in justifying the "floating bubble" of Schench. Id. at 399.
I4Id. at 398.
14 Id. In Madsen, the Court did not engage in a lengthy discussion of any of
the articulated state interests, but simply recited the interests relied on by the
Florida Supreme Court and concluded that "the combination of these governmental
interests is quite sufficient to justify an appropriately tailored injunction to protect
them." Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct 2516, 2526 (1994).
1" See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Vrllams, 898 P.2d 402,
410 (Cal. 1995) (buffer zone necessary to protect patients' safety and health as
well as to protect access), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3287 (US. Oct 6,
1995) (No. 95-576); Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Blythe, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 189,
199 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) ("face-to-face confrontation between the protesters and the
patients or staff members increases the health risks to patients), cert denied, 116
S. Ct. 514 (1995); Options v. Lawson, 670 A.2d 1081, 1085 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1996) ("courts may impose injunctive restrictions to protect health and patient
safety in appropriate circumstances").
"' See, e.g., Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding ordinance banning hand-held amplifier within 150 feet of medical facility).
" He made the same criticism of Judge Wmters opinion. Schenck, 67 F.3d at
400, 408.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: 547

criticized Judge Oakes for reciting the rigorous Madsen test
without actually applying it and disagreed with Judge Oakes's
deference to the district court because, pre-dating Madsen, it
had applied the more lenient time, place and manner test.'
Judge Meskill voted to strike down the fifteen-foot bubble/buffer zone because he considered the factual record here to
be less persuasive than the record in Madsen, and thus not
sufficient to justify the restrictions.15 In addition, Judge
Meskill found that the buffer/bubble zone provision duplicated
other provisions in the injunction,' and noted that the protestors had largely complied with the TRO.'52 Finally, Judge
Meskill asserted that alternative channels of communication
are not dispositive under Madsen, 5 ' notwithstanding
Madsen's statement that the protestors could be seen and
heard outside of the zone.'"
Even though he acknowledged that the "no approach"
provision was "more restrictive,"'55 Judge Meskill argued that
Madsen's invalidation of the 300-foot "no approach" zone
should govern the cease and desist provision.5 6 Judge
Meskill found both Madsen's "no approach" and Schenck's
cease and desist provisions "problematic in that they conferred
on potential counselees the right to control the ability of the
sidewalk counselors to engage in otherwise protected expressive speech in a public forum."'57 Judge Meskill criticized
Judge Oakes for applying the captive audience doctrine to
uphold the cease and desist provision on the grounds that patients entering clinics are not truly "captive."'58 According to
Judge Meskill, patients are not powerless to avoid sidewalk
counseling because they can escape "simply by continuing to
walk towards and entering the clinic."'59 Judge Meskill also

.4.
Id. at 399-400.
"0 Id. at 400-01.
...Id. at 401.
152 Id.
15

at 402-03.

Schenck, 67 F.3d at 403.

l" Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2527 (1994).
155 Schenck, 67 F.3d at 404.
'- Id. at 404-05.
117 Id. at 405.
158 Id.

...
Id. at 406. Judge Meskill also refused to recognize Madsen's language about
women "held captive by medical circumstance," Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.,
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argued that the cease and desist order was content- and viewpoint-based because it did not apply to patient escorts.'O
5. Judge Altimari's Opinion
Judge Altimari joined Judge Meskill's dissent, but also
wrote separately.' 6 ' He was particularly troubled by the floating nature of the bubble zone" and by the cease and desist
provision."6 He also disagreed with Judge Oakes's reliance
on the captive audience doctrine, but differed from Judge
Meskill in his analysis.' While Judge Altimari agreed that
women seeking abortion "may be, in some sense of the word,
'captives,"' he did not believe that the buffer/bubble zone
and the cease and desist provision were necessary to protect
such "captive" patients.'66
II. ISSUES CONFRONTED IN SCHENCK THAT WERE LEFT OPEN
IN MADSEN
The various opinions in Schenck reflect some of the issues
left open in Madsen, which have confronted other courts. Two
issues addressed in Schenck that are particularly important
subsequent to Madsen are: (1) what sort of factual record is
necessary to support a speech-restrictive injunction; and (2) if
and how the captive audience doctrine applies to patients at
reproductive health care facilities.

Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994), as supporting use of the captive audience doctrine here. Schenck, 67 F.3d at 406 n.5.
'- Schenck, 67 F.3d at 407. Judge Meskill noted that the Madsen Court explicitly left open the question of whether the "no approach" zone was content-based.
Id. at 407 n.7.
161Id. at 409-11.

12

Id. at 410.

0 Id. at 410-11.
Id- at 411.
Schenck 67 F.3d at 411.

1'

Im Id.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:5647

A. Necessary Factual Record to Support an Injunction that
Restricts Free Speech
One of the most vigorous disputes in Schenck and in other
post-Madsen cases concerns how much evidence is needed to
justify an injunction restricting speech. Specifically, courts and
individual judges disagree on whether a pattern of violence
needs to be established and whether an injunction that restricts speech can be entered only after a finding that a previous, less restrictive injunction has failed. The quantum of evidence is important because of fears, forcefully articulated by
Justice Scalia in his Madsen dissent, that a speech-restrictive
injunction can constitute a prior restraint.167 In Madsen, the
Supreme Court weighed in the balance the failure of a prior
injunction, stating that it is a factor that "may be taken into
consideration in evaluating the constitutionality of the broader
order."" In Schenck, the Oakes opinion correctly does not
consider the failure of a less restrictive injunction to be a reMadsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2541 (1994) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's concerns are somewhat ameliorated by another
decision issued by the Court the same day as Madsen. In International Union,
United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2562 (1994), the
Court articulated a new test for distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt of court, thus raising the standard of proof to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt for certain contempt proceedings now considered criminal in nature. In that
case, the Court held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt, determined through
"disinterested fact-finding and even-handed adjudication," was required for the imposition of over $52 million in contempt fines against a union for widespread violations of a complex labor injunction. In raising the standard for proving violations
of certain injunctions, Bagwell indirectly addressed Justice Scalia's prior restraint
concern. Id. at 2565 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing expansion of injunctive decrees in contemporary courts and concomitant need for criminal protections in
adjudicating violations).
1 114 S. Ct. at 2527. Justices Stevens and Scalia debated this point in their
concurring and dissenting opinions in Madsen. Justice Stevens opined that a
speech-restricting injunction can include "more than 'a simple proscription against
the precise conduct previously pursued'" because the trial judge must be able to
prevent "recurrence of the violation and to eliminate its consequences." Id. at 2531
(citations omitted). Justice Scalia, on the other hand, argued that unless a pattern
of violence has been established, a speech-restricting injunction constitutes an
unconstitutional prior restraint. Id. at 2541-42. He reiterated his concern a year
after Madsen, in a concurring opinion to a denial of certiorari in Lawson v.
Murray, 115 S. Ct. 2264 (1995). In that case, because the injunction was granted
even though there had not been any unlawful conduct, Lawson v. Murray, 649
A.2d 1253 (N.J. 1994), Justice Scalia concluded that it constituted an invalid prior
restraint.
1"
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quirement, and points out that in issuing preliminary injunctions courts routinely rely on evidence of conduct that has
ceased after the entry of a TRO.'" Other courts since Madsen
have also concluded that violating a prior injunction is not a
prerequisite. 70 However, the dissenters in Schenck would
make the failure of a prior, narrower injunction a precondition
of a broader injunction.'

By not requiring a prior violation of a narrower injunction,
Without
Judge Oakes's opinion takes the best approach.'
some evidence of unlawful or tortious conduct, a speech-re-

stricting injunction might constitute an invalid prior restraint.7 ' But it would be unduly onerous to require the violation of a prior, less restrictive injunction, because "district
courts routinely issue preliminary injunctions on the basis of
activities which, following a TRO, have already ceased."' As
Judge Oakes observed, it is often necessary for a court to rely
on pre-TRO evidence because the entry of a TRO causes most
defendants to refrain from prior unlawful conduct even though
they may resume that conduct if the TRO is not converted into

11 Schenck, 67 F.3d at 388; see id. at 398 n.1 (Wmter, J., concurring).
For example, in Feminist Women's Health Cr. v. Blythe, the court similarly
interpreted Madsen, concluding that "nothing in Madsen mandates that a less
restrictive prior injunction is a necessary prerequisite. The failure of a less restrictive order is simply a factor which 'may' be considered." 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 189, 200
(Cal Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 514 (1995). In that case the trial
court established a "speech free zone" around a clinic despite the lack of unlawful
conduct since the issuance of the temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction, noting that [clompliance with a court order is not voluntary discontinuance of prohibited conduct." Id. at 195.
' Schenck, 67 F.3d at 402 (Meskill, J., dissenting); id. at 410 (Altimari, J.,
dissenting). Complicating this dispute in Schenck are the differing views regarding
the record there. See infra text accompanying notes 179-184.
'12 Certainly, even though not required by Madsen, the post-TRO contempt
findings, Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 828 F. Supp. 1018 (W.D.N.Y.
1993), and witness testimony of post-TRO violations, Joint Appendix to Second Circuit In Bane Rehearing, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (in bane), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 1260 (1996), demonstrate the prior violation of a narrower restriction in
Schenck.
173 In Madsen, the Court found that the injunction was not a prior restraint
forbidden by New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (refusing
to enjoin publications of the "Pentagon Papers"), because the protestors could communicate their message outside the buffer zone and because the injunction was
issued because of "their prior unlawful conduct." Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.,
Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524 n.2 (1994).
170

17

Schenck, 67 F.3d at 388.
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a preliminary injunction. 175 Therefore, failure of a prior injunction should not be elevated to a prerequisite. Such a prerequisite would unduly hamper the discretion of district court
judges in fashioning effective injunctive relief.7 6 Because an
injunction is one step removed from a statute applicable to all
and can only be ordered after a showing of a proven violation
of law, it is an important tool in preserving the rule of law.
Thus, the trial judge's "unique familiarity with the facts" 17
should be given deference. As stated in Madsen, contempt of a
prior injunction is one factor that may be considered by the
trial court,178 in addition to evidence of unlawful conduct that
occurred prior to the injunction.
In this dispute, Judges Oakes and Meskill presented
starkly different interpretations of the record, and each accused the other of distorting the record.'79 Judge Meskill, in
dissent, stated that the buffer zone failed the Madsen test
because the "protestors generally obeyed the TRO,"' e and the
post-TRO findings of contempt are not sufficient to justify the
buffer zone.' 8 ' Judge Meskill thus concluded that Madsen,
which involved a "full-fledged blockade,"'82 presented a much
more extensive factual record. In contrast, Judge Oakes considered the facts that the plaintiffs had brought the case in
order to enjoin a threatened blockade, that the blockade did
not occur because of the TRO and that the district court had
"described at great length the 'emotionally charged' nature of
the demonstrations.'" Judge Oakes also stated that he found
"unpersuasive the dissent's reminder that Project Rescue dem-

Id.
This result is in keeping with the Madsen majority's view that an advantage
of injunctions over statutes is that "they can be tailored by a trial judge to afford
more precise relief. .. " 114 S. Ct. at 2524.
" Id. at 2532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178 Id. at 2527.
,7 See Schenck, 67 F.3d at 399-408 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
175

176

,

Id. at 402.

, Id. at 402-03. Judge Meskill also gave less weight to the five contempt findings, asserting that "only two of the five contempt violations stemmed from obstructionist behavior." Id. at 403.
1" Id. at 388. While Judge Winter did not believe that an extensive record was
necessary for his principle to apply and thus for "an injunction requiring physical
separation," he agreed that the record in Madsen was stronger. Id. at 396-97.
183 Id.
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onstrators generally complied with the TRO,"' pointing out
that "district courts routinely issue preliminary injunctions on
the basis of activities which, following a TRO, have already
ceased."' This dispute over the factual record is indicative of
the importance of conducting a fact-intensive inquiry under

Madsen.
B. Women Seeking Access to Abortion Clinics Are a Captive
Audience
In Madsen, the Court noted in its discussion of governmental interests that patients seeking access to abortion clinics
and hospitals were "held 'captive' by medical circum-

stance."86 Although the Court in Madsen did not elaborate,
its characterization of the patients as "captive," together with
cases applying the captive audience doctrine, suggests that the
doctrine provides an alternative ground for issuing the Schenck
injunction. Indeed, both the district court and Judge Oakes
relied on the captive audience doctrine to justify the cease and
desist provision.' However, the doctrine supports the buff-

er/bubble zone as well as the cease and desist provision.s

- Schenck, 67 F.3d at 388.
'Id.

Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994) (citing
Operation Rescue v. Womens Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 673 (Fla. 1993)
(applying captive audience doctrine)); see id. at 2533 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) ("the First Amendment protects the speaker's right to
offer 'sidewalk counseling' to all passersby. That protection, however, does not
encompass attempts to abuse an unreceptive or captive audience... especially
one on her way to receive medical service?); Lawson v. Murray, 115 S. Ct. 2264,
2267-68 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of writ of certiorari) (captive audience doctrine may provide alternative ground for injunction).
18 Schenck, 67 F.3d at 392; Pro-Choice Network Western New York v. Project
Rescue Western New York, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1435 (1992). Although Judge
Winter's concurrence might seem to be based on the captive audience doctrine, he
noted that the doctrine only served to "inform" his analysis, as it applied "regardless of the nature of the audience." Schenck, 67 F.3d at 397.
11 The Supreme Court has not clearly articulated whether the captive audience
doctrine is an additional state interest or an exception to First Amendment principles. See generally Haiman, supra note 121; Anne D. Lederman, Free Choice and
the First Amendment or Would You Read This if I Held It in Your Face and Refused to Leave?, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1287 (1995); Marcy Strauss, Redefining
the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 85 (1991); Note, Too
Close for Comfort: Protesting Outside Medical Facilities, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1856
(1988).
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The Supreme Court's captive audience cases attempt to
balance the speaker's right to communicate against the
listener's right to be left alone."8 9 For example, in Frisby v.
Schultz,"9 the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance that prohibited targeted residential picketing, noting that the abortion
doctor targeted there "[wals figuratively, and perhaps literally,
trapped within the home, and... [was] left with no ready
" ' Likewise, in
means of avoiding the unwanted speech."19
Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,'92 the Court
upheld a federal statute that allowed the recipient of unwanted
mail to give notice to the sender that the recipient wished to
receive no further mailings, thus requiring the sender to refrain from sending future mailings to the recipient.193
In balancing these competing rights, the Court's prior
cases reveal that it applies the captive audience doctrine when:
(1) a strong privacy interest is implicated;"9 (2) the target
cannot practically avoid unwanted communication; 95 and (3)
the restriction on speech is minimal. 9 ' Each of these factors
compels the application of the captive audience doctrine in
Schenck.
First, the privacy interest in Schenck is even stronger than
the residential privacy interest recognized in Frisby. The need
to protect patients about to undergo a medical procedure is
paramount, regardless of what type of medical procedure is
implicated. As the Supreme Court noted in NLRB v. Baptist
Hospital,Inc.:97

" Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
U.S. 474 (1988).
.. Id. at 487; see Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736 ("ITihe right of every person 'to be
let alone' must be placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate.").
190 487

19

397 U.S. 728 (1970).

Id. ("That we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and
subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must be captives everywhere."); id. at 738.
19 See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (residential privacy).
'
See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (commuters ride the bus by necessity and thus are a captive
audience); Haiman, supra note 121, at 182 (key is listener's ability "to remove
himself physically from the situation in order to avoid the communication").
9 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). These three factors
are derived from Strauss, supra note 188, at 116-21.
197 442 U.S. 773 (1979).
1
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Hospitals, after all, are not factories or mines or assembly plants.
They are hospitals, where human ailments are treated, where patients and relatives alike often are under emotional strain and worry, where pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets of
the day's activity, and where the patient and his family... need a
restful, uncluttered, relaxing and helpful atmosphere.'

Moreover, women seeking access to abortion clinics are not just
seeking medical care; they are exercising their constitutionallyprotected right to an abortion.' Like the householder in
Rowan,"e women seeking access to abortion clinics and hospitals have a privacy interest in being free from the harassing,
intimidating and threatening speech of "sidewalk counselors,"
while they exercise their right to an abortion."'
The second captive audience factor also supports the
speech restrictions in Schenck because women seeking access
to hospitals and clinics have no practical means of avoiding
unwanted communications. Although some argue that the
doctrine can only apply in the home, physical presence in the
home has not been the determinative factor in captive audience cases. Instead, the Court has focused on how difficult it is
for an individual to turn away from a message. Thus, for example, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, a plurality of the
Court held that bus commuters are a captive audience and
thus upheld a restriction on political advertisements placed
throughout the interior of the bus. Similarly, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,the Court relied on the captive audience doctrine to uphold a content-based ban of an afternoon radio
broadcast of George Carlin's "Seven Dirty Words" comedy routine. 3 Although courts and commentators often refer to Pacifica as a residential privacy case, the radio show was heard
not in the home, but in the car while a father was driving with
his young son.' 4 In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville' and

I'&ld
at 783-84 n.12 (citation omitted).
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
20 Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 729 (1970).
20,Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1425 (1992).
2Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974); see id. at 307

(Douglas, J., concurring) (relying more extensively than plurality on captive audience doctrine).
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949) ('In his home or on the
street [the unwilling listener] is practically helpless to escape this interference with
203
20
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Cohen v. California,21 6 the Court ruled that the doctrine did
not apply because any offended individual, as -a practical matter, could turn away. In noting that patients entering an abortion clinic or hospital are "held 'captive' by medical circumstance,"0 7 Madsen also suggests that the captive audience
doctrine applies outside the home.08
Indeed, it was much more difficult for patients and staff in
Schenck to escape the defendants' verbal and physical harassment than it was for the bus commuters in Lehman who simply could turn away from the advertisement by reading a book
or looking out the window, or the father in Pacifica who could
turn off the car radio. Yet in both cases, the Court applied the
captive audience doctrine notwithstanding the listeners' ability
to avoid the speech. In Schenck, the audience was not able to
avoid either the initial or subsequent communication both
because they could not physically remove themselves unless
they forewent needed medical care and because of the aural
nature of the expression." 9 It is easier to shut out visual

his privacy.") (emphasis added). That the home is not the touchstone for application of the doctrine is further illustrated by cases where the Court has rejected
the captive audience doctrine inside the home. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (recipient of objectionable mailing may easily
avert eyes and discard mail); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530 (1980) (same); Strauss, supra note 188, at 91.
20' 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) (striking down ban on drive-in movies containing
nudity that are visible from the street because pedestrians can avert their eyes
and thus are not a captive audience).
206 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971) (finding that persons in courthouse are not a captive audience because they can turn away from "Fuck the Draft" message on the
back of a jacket).
201 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994) (citing
Operation Rescue v. Womens Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 673 (Fla. 1993)).
206 In analogizing the patients' medical captivity to the residents' privacy in
Frisby, the Florida Supreme Court in Madsen stated that the underlying reasons
for the captive audience doctrine "appl[yl with even greater force where the object
of targeted picketing is the medical patient seeking treatment, rather than the
home-dweller. While targeted picketing of the home threatens the psychological
well-being of the 'captive' resident, targeted picketing of the hospital or clinic
threatens not only the psychological but the physical well-being of the patient held
'captive' by medical circumstance." Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 673.
209 One commentator has pointed out that in both Lehman and Pacifica, the
viewer and listener were not free to avoid the initial impact, but in both cases
one was capable of shutting out, either physically or mentally, any communications
beyond that. Haiman, supra note 121, at 178.
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communication such as written words or silent vigils, but "[we
cannot... shut out sounds so easily or quickly, and often
cannot do so at all."2 10
The fact that the district court in Schenck explicitly found
that defendants' own conduct closed off any practical means of
escape makes application of the captive audience doctrine to
this case uniquely appropriate. Even when the patients signal
their desire to be left alone, the "sidewalk counselors"
continue to follow right alongside them and persist in communicat-

ing their message. It is obvious, therefore, that women seeking access to plaintiffs' facilities cannot, as a practical matter, escape
defendants' message. Defendants' aggressive conduct makes it impossible for women entering the clinics simply to avert their eyes or
cover their ears in order to avoid receiving defendants' messageY'
In contrast, other cases where the Court has applied the doctrine have not included this additional factor. For example, the
captivity of the bus passengers in Lehman was not caused by
the candidate seeking to promote his political campaign on the
bus."u
Finally, the third captive audience factor also fully justifies the speech restrictions here. Both the fifteen-foot buffer/bubble zone and the cease and desist provision are minimal
restrictions on speech that allow for ample alternative avenues
for communication. Rather than muzzling all communication,
the buffer and bubble zones merely keep the protestors a short
fifteen feet away. Social science research establishes that an

210 Haiman, supra note 121, at 183 (analyzing Justice Douglass dissent in Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), and Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969)).
21 Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1436 (1992); See
Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 67 F.3d 377, 392 (1995) (relying on district
court findings to conclude that women seeking access to the clinics are 'captive3s);
id. at 411 (Altimari, J., dissenting) ("I do not dispute that people seeking acces to
clinics may be, in some sense of the word, 'captives."). Judge Meskill ignored the
extensive district court findings when he rejected the application of the captive
audience doctrine. Id. at 405-06 (Meskill, J., dissenting). For example, the explicit
district court findings directly contradict his assertion that patients 'can escape
the unwanted message simply by continuing to walk towards and entering the
clinic." Id. at 406 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
21 See Haiman, supra note 121, at 183 ("[Tihere is a significant difference between communication which pursues its audience and that which, figuratively
speaking, stands still, allowing its audience to exercise the right not to be spoken
to by getting away from the source."), 194.
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eight to twelve-foot zone of personal space is necessary in order
for strangers to feel comfortable communicating in public, and
that violation of this zone can lead to anxiety, stress and physiological arousal.213 The protestors still can chant, sing, pray,
hold signs, handbills, leaflets and otherwise communicate their
message from a distance of fifteen feet. The fifteen-foot zone is
so small that a protestor can engage in any method of verbal
and nonverbal communication with great efficacy. Indeed, at
oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, petitioners'
counsel identified only one activity--display of Biblical
text--that would be ineffective from a distance of fifteen feet.
Moreover, two "sidewalk counselors" can bring signs, leaflets
and handbills into the fifteen-foot bubble zones. As the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals correctly recognized, in allowing two
"sidewalk counselors" to approach each patient, the cease and
desist provision shields only unwilling listeners from
speech.214 In this sense, the cease and desist provision is
more protective of speech than the restrictions upheld in
Lehman and Pacifica, which restricted communications to
willing as well as unwilling listeners. Thus, although the Supreme Court in Schenck need not reach the captive audience
doctrine to uphold the disputed provisions, the doctrine provides further justification for a speech-restrictive injunction in
the particular context of patients entering a medical facility to
exercise a constitutional right.

213

See, e.g., MARIANNE LAFRANCE & CLARA MAYO, MOVING BODIES: NONVERBAL

COMMUNICATION IN SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 68-69, 83-91, 108-11 (1978); Edward T.

Hall, The Effects of Personal Space and Territory on Human Communication, in
NONVERBAL COMmUNICATION IN HUmIN INTERACTION 114-31 (Mark L. Knapp ed.,
1978); Leslie A. Hayduk, Personal Space: Where We Now Stand, 94 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 293 (1983); Warren M. Hem, Proxemics: The Application of Theory to Con.
flict Arising From Antiabortion Demonstrations, 12 POPULATION & ENVIRON. 379

(1991). One study found that anti-abortion protestors' behavior increased patients'
stress, but that clinic escorts provided an insulating buffer that moderated
patients' distress. Catherine Cozzarelli & Brenda Major, The Effects of Anti-Abor.
tion Demonstrators and Pro-Choice Escorts on Women's Psychological Responses to
Abortion, 13 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 404 (1994).
...Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 390-91; see Rowan v. United States Post
Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) ("no one has a right to press even 'good'
ideas on an unwilling recipient.").
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CONCLUSION

Court injunctions are an important tool in the ongoing
struggle to safeguard access to abortion clinics. Minimal restrictions such as Schenck's fifteen-foot, fixed buffer zone and
moving bubble zone, and the cease and desist order strike the
appropriate balance between protecting access and free speech.
They allow anti-choice protestors ample means of communicating their message while providing patients exercising their
constitutionally protected right to abortion with safe access to
medical facilities. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will recognize
the wisdom of the Second Circuit's in banc ruling.

